Abstract. We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [8], with respect to procedural control. In such control scenarios, an external agent seeks to change the outcome of an election via actions such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. SP-AV combines the voters' preference rankings with their approvals of candidates, and we adapt it here so as to keep its useful features with respect to approval strategies even in the presence of control actions. We prove that this system is computationally resistant (i.e., the corresponding control problems are NP-hard) to at least 16 out of 20 types of constructive and destructive control. Thus, for the 20 control types studied here, SP-AV has more resistances to control, by at least two, than is currently known for any other natural voting system with a polynomial-time winner problem.
Introduction
Voting provides a particularly useful method for preference aggregation and collective decision-making. While voting systems were originally used in political science, economics, and operations research, they are now also of central importance in various areas of computer science, such as artificial intelligence (in particular, within multiagent systems). In automated, large-scale computer settings, voting systems have been applied, e.g., for planning [11] and similarity search [14] , and have also been used in the design of recommender systems [19] and ranking algorithms [10] (where they help to lessen the spam in meta-search web-page rankings). For such applications, it is crucial to explore the computational properties of voting systems and, in particular, to study the complexity of problems related to voting (see, e.g., the survey by Faliszewski et al. [15] ).
The study of voting systems from a complexity-theoretic perspective was initiated by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick's series of seminal papers about the complexity of winner determination called the chair-seeks to influence the outcome of an election via procedural changes to the election's structure, namely via adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters (see Section 2.2 and the full version [12] for the formal definitions of our control problems). We consider both constructive control (introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [3] ), where the chair's goal is to make a given candidate the unique winner, and destructive control (introduced by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [22] ), where the chair's goal is to prevent a given candidate from being a unique winner.
We investigate the same twenty types of constructive and destructive control that were studied for approval voting [22] , and we do so for a voting system that was proposed by Brams and Sanver [8] as a combination of preference-based and approval voting. Approval voting was introduced by Brams and Fishburn ([4, 5] , see also [6]) as follows: Every voter either approves or disapproves of each candidate, and every candidate with the largest number of approvals is a winner. One of the simplest preferencebased voting systems is plurality: All voters report their preference rankings of the candidates, and the winners are the candidates that are ranked first-place by the largest number of voters. The purpose of this paper is to show that Brams and Sanver's combined system (adapted here so as to keep its useful features even in the presence of control actions) combines the strengths, in terms of computational resistance to control, of plurality and approval voting.
Some voting systems are immune to certain types of control in the sense that it is never possible for the chair to reach his or her goal via the corresponding control action. Of course, immunity to any type of control is most desirable, as it unconditionally shields the voting system against this particular control type. Unfortunately, like most voting systems approval voting is susceptible (i.e., not immune) to many types of control, and plurality voting is susceptible to all types of control.
1 However, and this was Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick's brilliant insight [3] , even for systems susceptible to control, the chair's task of controlling a given election may be too hard computationally (namely, NP-hard) for him or her to succeed. The voting system is then said to be resistant to this control type. If a voting system is susceptible to some type of control, but the chair's task can be solved in polynomial time, the system is said to be vulnerable to this control type.
The quest for a natural voting system with an easy winner-determination procedure that is universally resistant to control lasts for more than 15 years now. Among the voting systems that have been studied with respect to control are plurality, Condorcet, approval, cumulative, Llull, and (variants of) Copeland voting [3, 22, 23, 24, 16, 17] . Among these systems, plurality and Copeland voting (denoted Copeland 0.5 in [17] ) display the broadest resistance to control, yet even they are not universally control-resistant. The only system currently known to be fully resistant-to the 20 types of constructive and destructive control studied in [22, 23] and here-is a highly artificial system constructed via hybridization [23] . (We mention that this system was not designed for
